and those who have condemned it as a dangerously disruptive, violent passion. This two-faced intellectual history of pride reveals that we are not dealing with one clearly defined emotion, but with a cluster of emotions, sharing certain family resemblances, all having to do with the perceived status and recognition of the self. Analytically, it would be a mistake to distinguish sharply between these emotions. Such a conceptual move would blind us to their transmutable qualities, their blurred boundaries, and their ability to change fluidly from one emotion into another. We should appreciate how the delights of self-esteem or the pleasures of fellow-feeling can transform into toxic tribalism and haughty arrogance, how wounded pride can flash into anger, or how the confidence that pride inspires can devolve into the overconfidence of hubris, which in turn disrupts sound political decision-making. Such is the messy reality of human experience.

Orwell was right to single out pride as an important source of Nazi violence. Nazism's passionate, exclusionary, arrogant form of pride made its adherents capable of unspeakable violence. The joy of self-esteem and the pleasure of belonging helped forge strong affective bonds between the perpetrators, just as arrogant pride served to prevent such bonds from forming between the perpetrators and their victims. Pride motivated the perpetrators' loyalty and obedience. Pride inspired contempt toward the victims and indifference to their suffering. Pride gave emotional weight to ideological delusions, and in its excessively arrogant form of hubris, pride swept away Hitler's last hesitations, encouraging him to initiate and stubbornly pursue plans for the complete annihilation of the Jews of Europe.

Yet Orwell was also wrong about the emotions of the Nazis. He equated these emotions with ancient, primordial, irrational forces in human nature, forces that had now placed modern science and technology "in the service of ideas appropriate to the Stone Age."[70] But there was something distinctly modern about the pride of the Nazi perpetrators. Theirs was a pride that relied on conceptions of race and nation, and on the ability of the state to fundamentally reorder not only society but also humanity itself. This kind of pride did not belong to the Stone Age; it belongs at the very foundations of modern nationalism and modern genocide.

[70] Orwell, "Wells, Hitler," 193.

5

Pondering Hatred

Thomas Brudholm and Birgitte Schepelern Johansen*

Hatred is a complex and difficult thing, in life as well as in theory. Its history in Western philosophy is as long as the history of love. It begins, perhaps quite appropriately, with a warning. There is, said Socrates, nothing worse than *misology*, the hatred of rational argumentation.[1] In this form (at least), hatred is a matter of pathology, an evil to be prevented at all costs. At almost the same time and in exactly the same place, Aristotle told aspiring orators how to *incite* hatred (*misos*) in an audience. What he had in mind was definitely not misology. In his *Rhetoric*, hatred is presented as a normal and moral emotion, a socially acknowledged antagonism toward people with a vicious character or a harmful disposition.[2] Much later, David Hume asserted that hatred is "altogether impossible to define."[3] Apparently, Immanuel Kant disagreed. He clearly defined hatred as a passion. Still, he admitted that there is something particularly "deceitful and hidden" about it. In an exceptional poetic moment, he wrote that if the affect (*Affekt*) of anger is like water that breaks through a dam, the passion (*Leidenschaft*) of hatred is "like a river that digs itself deeper and deeper into its bed."[4] In fact, hatred has never been neatly defined or consistently categorized. Some philosophers have tried to delimit hatred by distinguishing it from anger, love, or revenge. Others have insisted on various sorts of entanglement between these same emotional phenomena. Some are preoccupied with the legitimacy of the modern criminalization of

* Thanks to Lucy Allais, Jeffrey Blustein, David Konstan, Jeffrie Murphy, Thomas Szanto, and Dan Zahavi for helpful comments and suggestions.

[1] Plato, *Plato's Phaedo*, transl. R Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 89d.

[2] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, transl. W. R. Roberts, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1382a1–16.

[3] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* [1740] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 214.

[4] Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* [1798] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 150.

enactments of various kinds of group hatred. Others – dissatisfied with lazy notions that *all* hatred is a bad thing – are keen to provide "a word on behalf of good haters."[5] Taken as a whole, the history of views on hatred may serve to remind us that we can – and probably sometimes should – ponder what we mean when we talk about hatred.

In the field of Holocaust and genocide studies, there is no shortage of reasons for such reflection. There is a sickening amount of evidence of hateful incitement in the archives on atrocity crimes, and hatred is a recurring theme in interviews and trials of perpetrators as well as in testimonies of victims and bystanders. Consider, for example, the case of Adolf Eichmann. "His hatred," as it is stated in the judgment of the Israeli court where he stood trial, "was cold and calculated, aimed rather against the Jewish people as a whole, than against the individual Jew, and for this very reason, it was so poisonous and destructive in all its manifestations."[6] Hannah Arendt, as we all know, saw nothing like that. She knew of course that "evil men" are supposed to be prompted, among other things, by hatred. However, what struck her was "a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives."[7]

Perhaps hatred, unlike emotions such as anger or disgust, can be difficult to detect? "We are all pretending," said a Bosniak woman from the city of Mostar, "to be nice and to love each other. But, be it known that I hate them and that they hate me. It will be like that forever, but we are now pretending."[8] Jean Améry, our final example, did not pretend. He reflected publicly on the emotions with which his condition as a victim of the Nazi genocide was inflected: astonishment, distrust, fear, resentment – and hatred. The latter he knew from having been exposed to it. "To be a Jew" in the Third Reich was "to be a dead man on leave."[9] However, the topic of hatred is also at issue in his reflections on *ressentiment* (which he insisted was *not* a matter of hatred) and in his mixed feelings for his Austrian home (*Heimatsehnsucht* mixing with *Heimathass*). Hatred – in the context of mass atrocities – takes many forms and raises a plethora of questions.

5 Jeffrie G. Murphy, "A Word on Behalf of Good Haters," *Hedgehog Review* 18, no. 2 (2016), 91–97.
6 Cited from: www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/
7 Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, 1978), 5.
8 Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (2004), 561–583, here 561.
9 Jean Améry, *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor of Auschwitz and Its Realities* [1966], transl. S. Rosenfeld and S. P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 86.

Still, the scholarly discussion has been focused rather exclusively on the *role* of hatred among the causes of mass destruction. At the one end of the spectrum one finds scholars such as Daniel J. Goldhagen, for whom hatred, in the form of *eliminationism*, is the single most important factor behind genocidal violence. At the other end of the spectrum, a larger group of researchers argues that hatred is much less significant than one would perhaps expect. A telling title in this group is *Murder without Hatred*.[10] In the middle, an even larger number of scholars present some kind of multi-factor analysis in which hatred plays a moderate role.[11] However, whether hatred is posited as all-important, completely marginal, or something in between, there is a general lack of reflection on the nature or meaning of hatred as such.[12] Our aim in this chapter is to engage in such reflection, not just to qualify the discussion of hatred's causal role, but more importantly to invite reflection on the very nature and possible forms of hatred at stake in mass atrocities.

BAUMAN ON HATRED

We begin our investigation with a brief examination of the meaning of hatred in the works of Zygmunt Bauman. We do not take a position in the above-mentioned debate as to the causal role of hatred, and our decision to take Bauman as our starting point reflects neither a particular endorsement nor a rejection of his position regarding the causal role of hatred. Rather, our choice reflects two points. First, that he provides an exemplary case of the ambivalent place of hatred in much work on genocide and mass atrocity – that is, hatred as something important yet scantly conceptualized. Second, for both of us, Bauman's work on the Holocaust was the point of entry into the study of the Holocaust and mass atrocities more generally. Curiously, when we first read Bauman – decades ago – we were both enthusiastic about his arguments

10 Anton Weiss-Wendt, *Murder without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009). See also Scott Straus, "What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda's 'Radio Machete,'" *Politics and Society* 35, no. 4 (2007), 609–637, and Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* [1989] (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
11 See Neta Crawford, this volume. Also, Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
12 For well-reflected uses of the concept of hatred, see Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).

concerning modernity, bureaucracy, and indifference. Like Bauman, we did not question the concept of hatred at stake in the entire exercise. But now we are moved to ask: what is the meaning of hatred in Bauman's account of the Holocaust?

Across several works, starting with *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman argued that hatred does not explain the Holocaust. The mass murder was an outcome, first and foremost, of scientifically sustained projects of social and racial engineering, made possible by technological developments and an effective bureaucracy. Mass destruction could not rely on something as precarious and unpredictable as the emotions, but had to be organized and routinized. The prime vice was not hatred, but a combination of manufactured unconcern and an unbridled faith in social engineering. Bauman's analysis contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the roles played by the thousands of people who took part in the Holocaust: the bureaucrat consumed not so much by ideological hatred as by a desire to fulfill his duties; the soldier performing his tasks without any deeper understanding of Nazi ideology; engineers and doctors primarily dedicated to their own careers and agendas; and, not least, the many people who went along unthinkingly, perhaps refusing to look deeper into the events that took place around them.

Bauman's conclusion that hatred is marginal was reached with little critical reflection on its conceptual premises, and even though he wrote at length about anti-Semitism, its history, and dynamics, the relationship between anti-Semitism and hatred was never unpacked. Maybe this is not surprising, as Bauman's understanding of hatred seems largely instrumental to, or subsumed under, another, more important aim: to assert the inherently *modern* nature of the Holocaust. Claiming that the Holocaust was caused by hatred is, according to Bauman, wrong, because such a claim fails to acknowledge the difference between the mechanisms of group violence and individual violence. Individual violence, according to Bauman, can be "rooted in personal passions, desires, hate, greed," but these personal passions explain little when it comes to mass murder:

> The mass murder of the Jews was not an outcome of a momentary outburst of crowd passion but of a long-term, systematic activity that involved meticulous planning, careful division of labor, and the cooperation of "ordinary" institutions and businesses normally engaged in such neutral operations as running the railway network, designing trucks, developing new chemicals, or building houses. As in all complex operations in which partial tasks must be closely correlated so that they combine in the fulfillment of the overall purpose, the Holocaust required neutralization of all personal motives that could interfere with the master plan: Its success could not be made dependent on such imponderable and unmanageable factors as the emotions and personal beliefs of the actors – for instance, the intensity of Jew-hatred in each of the hundreds of thousands of participants.[13]

Worse still, to claim that hatred caused the Holocaust is not just mistaken; it is also occluding, because it protects from criticism and reflection that which most urgently needs it: modernity, its logics and institutions. The idea that the Holocaust was a (re)lapse into barbarity, a collapse of reason into pre-modern irrational passions, inhibits us from seeing that the Holocaust was completely within the bounds of modern society – that, indeed, the Nazi genocide would have been unthinkable without the elements that make up modernity:

> Modernity would not get where it has got were it to rely on forces as erratic, whimsical, and thoroughly unmodern as human passions. Instead, it relied on the division of labor, on science, technology, scientific management, and the power of the rational calculation of costs and effects – all thoroughly unemotional.[14]

In making this argument, Bauman expresses an understanding of hatred as a personal passion: an erratic, whimsical, unmanageable, imponderable entity – located firmly within the mysterious depths of individual psychology and operating exclusively in the realm of motives for interpersonal action. As the opposite of reason and rational calculation, hatred is – according to Bauman – thoroughly unmodern: "Modern mind shuns passion . . . Whoever kills for love or hatred is out of modern bounds."[15]

To be fair, Bauman never intended to develop a sustained argument to support his assertions about hatred. It would therefore hardly be appropriate to reproach him for not elaborating his conception of hatred, because a conceptualization of hatred was not the issue. Bauman's main concern was to explain the Holocaust, and his account relied on a fairly conventional Western notion of emotion/passion as irrational, unmanageable, unpredictable, and interiorized.[16] Yet, seen from the perspective of the sociology and philosophy of emotions, Bauman's assertions about emotions in general and hatred in particular seem rather simplistic and beg further elaboration and

[13] Zygmunt Bauman, "Holocaust," in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. Joel Krieger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), unpaginated (online version).

[14] Zygmunt Bauman, "The Holocaust," in *A Companion to Ethnic and Racial Studies*, ed. David T. Goldberg and John Solomos (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), unpaginated (online version).

[15] Bauman, "The Holocaust," unpaginated.

[16] See Catherine Lutz, "Engendered Emotion: Gender, Power, and the Rhetoric of Emotional Control in American Discourse," in *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, ed. Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 69–91.

critical discussion. Drawing on insights from the philosophical work on the nature, meaning, and location of emotions, we aim to bring a more nuanced understanding of hatred to the field of genocide studies.

ON EMOTIONS

In a moment we will focus specifically on hatred, but let us first attend briefly to the concept of emotions in general. While Bauman's marginalization of hatred builds on the idea that emotion and passion represent the very opposite of reason and rationality,[17] most scholarship on the topic adopts a less dichotomous approach. As suggested by Jacques Barbalet, there are at least two alternatives to Bauman's "conventional" approach: "the critical approach, in which emotion supports rationality by providing it with salience and goal-formation; and the radical approach, in which emotion and rationality are seen to be continuous."[18] Our investigation builds on conceptual tools and insights from both of these alternatives.

Let us begin with the idea that emotions make the world not only known but significant to us.[19] What is specifically emotional derives precisely from the directedness toward an object, which in an acute way tells us that something is going on in our world.[20] "Emotions," as Ben Ze'ev argues, "serve to safeguard and monitor our personal concerns."[21] Such assertions about the personalizing function of emotions should not prompt us to think that emotions are thereby random, private, or in any way detached from broader social contexts. Rather, the internalization and embodiment of community norms are part of what makes possible the notion of a self that can personally feel respected, insulted, recognized, violated, and so on.[22] In this sense, one aspect of the emotions is their ability to actualize norms and values in the flesh, so to speak; for example, anger arises when one's norms are being violated, and reassurance or trust when they are being confirmed. Through this intensification of something (persons, actions, relation, events) as relevant,

[17] See: "passion is, by definition, the unreason. When we speak of passion, we also speak of the nonbeing of reason. Passion and reason are at loggerheads: one wilts and fades in the face of the other," Bauman, "The Holocaust," unpaginated (online version).

[18] Jacques Barbalet, *Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 29.

[19] Aron Ben Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000), 13, Peter Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 50.

[20] Goldie, *The Emotions*, 238. [21] Ben Ze'ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions*, 18.

[22] Robert Post, "Hate Speech," in *Extreme Speech and Democracy*, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 123–138, here 129.

emotions often simultaneously consolidate or verify the sense of the "me" or the "us" harboring the emotion.

Emotions are not mere bodily sensations or arousals. We might feel nauseous, we might have a beating heart, or sweaty palms, or restless legs, but that is only part of the emotional experience. In emotions, we are directed toward something in our world – namely, the object that the emotional experience is about.[23] This object might seem unclear (such as when you feel sad without really knowing why) or misdirected (such as when you get angry at your spouse because your boss is an idiot), but directedness or intentionality is still a defining part of most emotional experiences (moods like anxiety or boredom excepted).[24] In emotions, the bodily arousal therefore connects with certain thoughts and judgments about the object of the emotion, tied together by culturally available narrative structures.[25] The beating heart, sweaty palms, and restless legs are part of an experience that we might call, for example, anger toward someone who has betrayed us, contempt or pity toward those we consider low, or fear of that or those who threaten us. Whether it is one or the other – or one of the many possible inflections for which we do not always have particularly suitable emotion labels – depends not least on the broader narrative organization that the bodily arousals are part of. Norms about proper conduct, about being worthy, about what is expected from us, or about what we are supposed to fear are thus part of the emotional experience and tie the bodily arousal to biographical memory, to political circumstances, to ideological frameworks, etc.[26] Likewise, mere cognition and evaluation about an object in the world does not constitute an emotion. What Peter Goldie called the "add on" principle for emotions tends to overemphasize the cognitive aspects, treating the affective or bodily aspects merely as an appendage to the emotional experience.[27]

Emotions have always been thought to involve a link to action. Indeed, this is what the term *emotion* indicates.[28] Whether the link is direct or indirect, emotions involve motives, desires, maybe even behavioral dispositions or action tendencies. For example, anger may be thought to be or to imply

[23] Peter Goldie uses the distinction between "bodily feeling" and "feeling towards" to grasp this dual composition of the intentionality of emotions. See Goldie, *The Emotions*.

[24] Goldie, *The Emotions*, 18, 21. [25] Goldie, *The Emotions*, 5.

[26] Margeret Wetherell, *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding* (London: Sage, 2012), 13.

[27] Peter Goldie, "Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2002), 235–254.

[28] According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the etymology of "emotion" suggests commotion, unrest, movement, agitation, displacement, and the like, of anything from the mind to the public or indeed a people.

a desire for revenge, and fear an impulse to flee. The basic idea that emotions inform or influence our actions or dispositions to act is perhaps the main reason why genocide scholars have shown some interest in hatred, and why the discussion of hatred in genocide studies has focused almost exclusively on the question of the causal role of hatred in explanations of the violence. However, although the relation between emotion and action in the case of hatred is generally thought to be relatively strong, one should take care *not* to assume any direct route from emotion to action. This was clear to Charles Darwin in his investigations of the expressions of the emotions in human beings and other animals:

> A man may have his mind filled with the blackest hatred or suspicion, or be corroded with envy or jealousy, but as these feelings do not at once lead to action, and as they commonly last for some time, they are not shown by any outward sign, excepting that a man in this state assuredly does not appear cheerful or good-tempered.[29]

We noticed in Bauman the claim that emotions, hatred not least, are imponderable. However, in the following sections we will examine what happens if one ponders hatred as an emotion. As we hope to show, Bauman's account of hatred and emotion as the opposite of reason and rationality and as located firmly within some interiorized, subjective experience tends to mask the plethora of observations that can actually be made as to the cognitive, evaluative, conative, structural, and material aspects of hatred.

PONDERING HATRED

What happens if one brings to bear the analytical categories and distinctions (presented in the previous section) on a messy bundle of philosophical notions and ostensible examples of hatred[30] (gathered from the Western tradition and the modern history of genocidal violence)? Most basically, we reckon that readers will agree that hatred is *not* imponderable, and we hope that they will

[29] Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* [1872] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 79.

[30] Given our interest in the context of mass atrocities, we generally refer to hatred rather than hate. As suggested by W. I. Miller, "hatred, the noun, and to hate, the verb, do not completely coincide in their semantic ranges. Hatred carries with it more intensity and greater seriousness than many of our most common uses of the verb," William I. Miller, "Hatred," in *The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences*, ed. David Sander and Klaus R. Scherer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 203–204, here 203.

gain a deeper and broader understanding of hatred, its phenomenological and conceptual ambiguities included.[31]

Let us begin with the basic idea that emotions typically motivate or prompt us to wish, desire, want, or even do something. This is where most philosophers have located the heart of hatred. In Plato, hatred (in the form of misology) turns the afflicted away from what should count most (the pursuit of truth), as it prompts an enduring loathing of all argumentation.[32] In Aristotle, hatred implies a wish that the odious other would cease to exist. Again, among the Stoics, hatred was defined as "a desire for something bad to happen to another progressively and continually."[33] Much later, Kierkegaard presented a notion of hatred that induces relentless abandon: "I will never see this person again. Our paths are forever divided, separated by the yawning depth of hatred."[34] Finally, in the shadow of the Holocaust, Aurel Kolnai observed:

> Prototypically, the "movement" proper to hatred is directed to the destruction of its object; or at least to an impact on the object stopping short of destruction but aligned with it and consonant to its spirit or symbolic of destruction in one essential respect (humiliation, insult, expulsion, etc.).[35]

Kolnai's claim, that hatred is inspired and governed prototypically by a destructive intent, seems dominant in reflections on hatred in the context of political mass violence. Sometimes the point is openly stated ("the action-tendency [of hatred] is to cause B to cease to exist or otherwise be rendered harmless, for instance by permanent expulsion");[36] sometimes it is simply implied ("the antiman, as [Jean] Améry calls him, embodies hatred, for he

[31] Our basic understanding of what pondering emotions can, at best, amount to is inspired not least by the works of Peter Goldie.

[32] Plato, *Phaedo*, 90d.

[33] Cited from David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 189. The definition probably builds on an interpretation of Aristotle's suggestion that one should think of hatred as the opposite of love. Aristotle did not define hatred in the *Rhetoric*, but he defined loving (*to philein*) as "wishing for the beloved what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about," 1381a1.

[34] Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love: Some Christian Reflections in the Form of Discourses* [1847], transl. H. Hong and E. Hong (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 2009), 286. The link between hatred and abandonment is illustrated near the end of the Danish movie *The Celebration* (directed by Thomas Vinterberg, Nimbus Film, 1998). The incestuous patriarch has been exposed publicly. He acknowledges that his children might appropriately hate him, and that he might never see again the friends and family gathered in the house.

[35] Aurel Kolnai, "The Standard Modes of Aversion: Fear, Disgust and Hatred," *Mind* 107, no. 427 (1981), 581–595, here 590.

[36] Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 230.

wishes to annihilate Améry and his kind").[37] In comparison, the Stoic approach to hatred as a matter of malevolence is more prevalent in discussions of personal forms of hatred. For example, in a recent essay, Jeffrie Murphy considers hatred as "a desire – based on the evil actions of the hated one – that the evildoer experience what he would regard as the worst thing that could happen to him – death for some people, perhaps, but for others something (in their view) even worse."[38]

Whether experienced as a desire to harm or destroy, abandon, or expel, hatred lies at the extreme end of the emotions at stake in our relational lives. The aims or desires involved in hatred differ interestingly from those characteristically related to anger or resentment. As noticed by Peter F. Strawson, resentment tends to inhibit goodwill somewhat, but in a way that is tied to regarding the wrongdoer as a member – in relatively good standing – of the moral community.[39] As a response to a perceived breach of a normative expectation, resentment may motivate demands that the moral nature of what happened be acknowledged, that the culpable party be appropriately censured, that retribution be exacted or reassurance that the norms that have been breached be back in order. None of this, however, implies a wish or desire to seriously harm, kill, or get rid of the wrongdoer as such.

Whether one ties hatred to a desire to harm, cause pain, or even annihilate its object, it seems logical to assume that such desires can be satisfied or at least exhausted. As Arne Johan Vetlesen suggests, "Having sought, found, and destroyed its chosen object, hate is exhausted, its subject content."[40] However, what haters desire or wish is sometimes something more unlimited or insatiable. In the poem "For Adolf Eichmann," Primo Levi wrote,

> Oh son of death, we do not wish you death.
> May you live longer than anyone ever lived.
> May you live sleepless five million nights,
> And may you be visited each night by the suffering of everyone who saw,
> Shutting behind him, the door that blocked the way back,
> Saw it grow dark around him, the air fill with death.[41]

37 C. Fred Alford, *Trauma and Forgiveness: Consequences and Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 171.

38 Murphy, "A Word," 93.

39 Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London: Methuen, 1974).

40 Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry into the Preconditions of Moral Performance* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 252.

41 Primo Levi, *Collected Poems*, transl. R. Feldman and B. Swann (London: Faber & Faber, 1988), 64.

Obviously, Levi does not believe that Eichmann will be able to live almost 14,000 years. At stake is a curse, expressive perhaps of an impossible wish for a retribution that would befit the magnitude of the crime. The wish is insatiable. But to express the wish that something like that should have happened to Eichmann, "progressively and continually" (as the Stoics would have it), is morally possible, perhaps an example of poetic justice. Still, in accordance with the point suggested by Vetlesen, a person (perhaps Levi) who feels such a wish will probably reach a time or a point where living or harboring the wish will no longer be humanly possible (even if it would still be morally justified or permissible). The desire or wish in hatred may also be unquenchable for a very different reason. "If it is true," as David Konstan writes, "that we sometimes hate an aspect of ourselves that we have projected onto another, then we remain attached to the abominated other, and do not really wish to eliminate him or her."[42] In this case, "hate transforms this or that other into an object whose expulsion or incorporation is needed, an expulsion or incorporation that requires the conservation of the object itself in order to be sustained."[43]

Our next analytical question pertains to the intentional *object* of hatred. Toward what can the eliminatory or malevolent desires be directed? Certainly, hatred can be deeply personal, directed against a particular individual. However, hatred can also be felt toward entire groups and categories. In Plato, misologues hate *all* argumentation and misanthropes hate *every* human being, and as Aristotle frankly put it, "we all hate *any* thief and *any* informer" (our emphasis).[44] Likewise, anti-Semites hate Jews, misogynists hate women, and the archives of genocidal propaganda overflow with expressions of hatred toward Armenians, Tutsi, and so on. The formal object, in all of the given cases, is an entire category of people, practices, or things. Notice, however, the difference between the categories at stake in what has been called modern hatreds (hatreds focused on entire identity groups) and the ancient Aristotelian view of hatred as directed toward categories of people who are judged to be of a vicious character or hostile disposition. At stake in the *Rhetoric* is the hatred of the traitor or the thief, not of the Jew, the Muslim, the Black (or white), or the gay. However, a closer look at the modern hatreds reveals – we think – that they are all, beneath the surface, about a wildly untenable idea of a nexus between a given group identity and moral evil. One never simply hates another "because he is Black." One hates this other because

42 Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, 199.

43 Sarah Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 51.

44 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1382a.