

one associates being Black with a menace. Also, if one hates every Tutsi or Jew as such, it may not really matter whether someone is male or female, child or adult, bright or stupid, a compatriot or a stranger, because every one of them is an instance of the kind or type or "race" toward which one's hatred is directed. In this way, "hated concentrates the attention of whoever holds that emotion."<sup>45</sup> What the odious others, as individuals, have done, or what they individually think and feel, does not matter. We "know" that they are all evil. However, this logic of hate is – in reality – typically difficult to sustain, vulnerable to the non-identity of the actual other in relation to a projected picture of an essential menace. Hence, entrepreneurs of hatred do their best to cultivate a second-order norm, which holds that what members of the out-group actually and individually feel and think *should* not or *must* not matter, that being susceptible to the thoughts and feelings of the targeted people is a sign of weakness. As the propagandists of the genocide in Rwanda put it in the eighth of the so-called "Ten Commandments of the Bahutu": "The Bahutu *must* cease to have any pity for the Batutsi."<sup>46</sup> The cultivation of such norms can go hand in hand with the introduction of institutions, habits, and practices that aim to make the fearful and odious imaginary a self-fulfilling prophecy.

All we have said so far – and all that is typically said in writings on hatred in the context of mass atrocities – has focused on the genocidal hatred of the perpetrators against a specific victim group. Opening the field of genocide studies to a more comprehensive investigation of hatred implies an inclusion of other possible objects. One could focus, for example, on victims' hatred – their hatred toward particular individual perpetrators or specific organizations for what they have actually done. Such victim hatred would surely be markedly different insofar as the object is – sadly – *not* a product of fantasy and projection, but grim reality: the object is a person or an organization that (in actions as well as attitudes) has proved him-, her-, or itself to be committed to evil. Within the same perspective (victim hatreds), one finds hatreds toward an entire people in whose name genocide has been committed. When asked whether he hated the Germans, Primo Levi said that he did not "accept hatred as directed collectively at an ethnic group, for example at all the Germans; if I accepted it, I would feel that I was following the precepts of Nazism, which were founded precisely on national and racial hatred."<sup>47</sup> Other object

categories could be abstract ideological entities (such as Nazism or Fascism), general evils (such as violence),<sup>48</sup> and the self (whether one was oneself a victim, bystander, or perpetrator).<sup>49</sup> Clearly, the justifiability of some of these other manifestations of hatred differs markedly from genocidal hatreds, premised as they are on extreme stereotyping, prejudice, and projection. To probe the difference, we need to turn to the beliefs, appraisals, and judgments at stake in hatred.

One does not simply hate someone or something. One hates them or it for being or having done something; one hates it or them for a reason; one believes or judges it or them to be or represent something. But what? Do we hate for a specific kind or range of reasons? In Plato, the misanthrope believes that every human being is "completely and utterly rotten."<sup>50</sup> In Aristotle, hatred is based on moral judgment or perception that the odious other is a bad or vicious kind of person. From a moral philosophical perspective, it is interesting to consider whether it is possible to harbor such judgments or perceptions *and* be open to evidence that the other can change, or maybe already has changed, in some morally relevant way (for example, through acts of remorse and atonement). However, with regard to deadly ethnic or genocidal group hatred, we agree with Donald Horowitz: "Those who hate believe that the object of their hatred has properties that do not change. They believe that, in a certain sense, the objects of hatred cannot help themselves, that the attributes are embedded in their nature."<sup>51</sup> As we read in an article printed in the Rwandan propaganda magazine *Kangura* from March 1993, "A cockroach gives birth to a cockroach . . . the history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same."<sup>52</sup> In short, in modern genocides, the target group and its members are defamed, discriminated against, or attacked as instances or incarnations of an odious essence. As Joseph Goebbels put it, with scary precision, "Die Juden sind Schuld" – "the Jews are guilt."<sup>53</sup> Not, "the Jews are guilty." The twisting of the ordinary grammar of guilt mirrors precisely the genocidal twisting of ordinary moral assumptions as to the objects and presuppositions of accountability.

<sup>45</sup> See Karl Popper: "There are many people who hate violence and are convinced that it is one of their foremost and at the same time one of the most hopeful tasks to work for its reduction and, if possible, for its elimination from human life." K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002), 477.

<sup>46</sup> See Jean Améry, *At the Mind's Limits*, 51 (on self-hatred).

<sup>47</sup> *Phaedo*, transl. R. Hackforth, 89c. <sup>48</sup> Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 544.

<sup>49</sup> Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2004), 50.

<sup>50</sup> Jeffrey Hef, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 122.

<sup>45</sup> Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, 543.

<sup>46</sup> Smetelin, *Purity and Destroy*, 76, emphasis added.

<sup>47</sup> Primo Levi, "A Self-Interview: Afterword to *If This Is a Man* (1976)," in *The Voice of Memory: Interviews, 1961–1987*, ed. Marco Belpoliti and Robert Gordon, transl. R. Gordon (New York, NY: The New Press, 2001), 184–207, here 185.

To build up *intense* hatred, the object has to be perceived not simply as an abstract evil, but as an evil and a fearful threat to us.<sup>54</sup> Consider, for example, the Nazi *imagination* of “the Jew”: an allegedly existential threat to “us,” a fantastic picture of a monstrous creature filled with malevolence and hatred.<sup>55</sup> More generally, public incitements of hatred against entire groups provide evidence of how the public cultivation of collective hatred typically builds on allegations of malevolence or bad will from the out-group against the in-group and its members. Through wildly exaggerated if not completely unsubstantiated rumors, the out-group is presented as hell-bent on the destruction of the in-group, and detailed accounts of the atrocities committed by the others provide “evidence” about the depths of their cruel and hateful intentions.<sup>56</sup> Genocidal hatred can be intertwined not only with fear, but also with disgust – that is, in the form of narratives and representations of the object as something that may pollute or poison the social body. Such ideas of pollution are typically enforced by representations of the object as vermin or diseases. The portrayals of, for example, Tutsis as cockroaches and Jews as rats or blood poisoning are well known.<sup>57</sup>

Are the beliefs or judgments implied in hatred *always* unjustified or morally untenable? Nazi or racist hatred is the epitome of an attitude toward others that cannot be supported by even minimally “reasonable” reasons. But what if we focus instead on hatred directed toward a particular individual evildoer: a willing executioner, an excessively callous and sadistic torturer? The hatred of such evildoers may of course be based on the torturer’s evil actions, but in hatred, contempt, and disgust, the actions are typically taken as testimony of a vicious character, an evil person. Can such beliefs and judgments ever be warranted? People are seldom (if ever) monolithically bad, and even so a person’s character can change. This is a difficult issue. Further clarification requires discussion of whether hatred is always “globalizing.”<sup>58</sup>

Our final analytical question is about how it *feels* to hate. As mentioned in the previous section, feelings or bodily arousals are essential to almost any

account of the emotions. Even Aristotle, a strong cognitivist, defines the emotions as constituted in part by accompanying feelings of pain and pleasure. The problem with hatred is that while he clearly presents it as an emotion, he also claims that it is *not* accompanied by pain. This is not the place for a discussion of this apparent contradiction in his *Rhetoric*.<sup>59</sup> We simply want to use it as a first, but also a very telling, example of a basic challenge for most accounts – whether ancient or modern – of hatred: namely, that hatred can take both the form of an enduring attitude or sentiment and of an occurrent emotion. Insofar as we are talking about hatred as an attitude or a sentiment, it does not necessarily involve any individuating or distinct feelings of pain and pleasure. Indeed, it might even – as Aristotle claimed – be painless (and thus compatible with cool, rational calculation). Instead, one’s hatred is revealed or expressed in the emotions and feelings to which one is disposed. One may, for example, realize that one hates someone or something because of the emotions and feelings to which relations to the odious object give rise: pleasure by the promise of their extinction, disgust in their bodily proximity, pride by participation in their destruction.<sup>60</sup> But what about hatred as an occurrent emotion? Insofar as we may here draw on an example from literature rather than the history of mass atrocities, we may get a vivid description of what it feels like to hate if we listen to Dr. Frankenstein as he reflects on his feelings toward his creation:

My abhorrence of this fiend cannot be conceived. When I thought of him I gnashed my teeth, my eyes became inflamed, and I ardently wished to extinguish that life which I had so thoughtlessly bestowed. When I reflected on his crimes and malice, my hatred and revenge burst all bounds of moderation.<sup>61</sup>

To feel hate, as an emotion, may be exactly this: rage, aggression, teeth gnashing, eyes inflamed, and – most importantly – a burning desire to harm or destroy a deserving object. It is probably systematically unresolvable whether a particular expression of hatred is an expression of an occurrent emotion or an enduring attitude. Consider this excerpt from a speech delivered in Amsterdam in 1942 by Nazi Labor Front leader Robert Ley. “The Jew,” he said, “is a great danger to humanity”:

<sup>59</sup> See David Konstan, “Rhetoric and Emotion,” in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 411–426.

<sup>60</sup> For similar points with regard to love, see Peter Goldie, “Love for a Reason,” *Emotion Review* 2, no. 1 (Jan 2010), 61–67.

<sup>61</sup> Mary W. Shelley, *Frankenstein: Or, the Modern Prometheus* (London: C. & W. B. Whitaker, 1823), 187.

<sup>54</sup> This is of course not the only path to intense hatred. For example, the intensity of hatred can be the result of an embittered love or some other kind of original attachment and subsequent disappointment. Also, if someone kills a child the parents may hate the murderer even though they do not fear her or him.

<sup>55</sup> For more on hatred induced through fear, see Neta Crawford’s chapter in this volume.

<sup>56</sup> See Sennekin, *Purity and Destroy*, and Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*.

<sup>57</sup> See Andreas Musolf, “What Role Do Metaphors Play in Racial Prejudice? The Function of Antisemitic Imagery in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 41, no. 1 (2007), 21–43.

<sup>58</sup> See Kate Abramson, “A Sentimentalist’s Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 189–213.

it is not enough to take him someplace [ihn irgend wohin zu bringen]. That would be as if one wanted to lock up a louse somewhere in a cage [laughter]. It would find a way out and again it come out from underneath and make you itch again [laughter]. You have to annihilate [vernichten] them, you have to exterminate [them for what] they have done to humanity ... [interrupted by ongoing applause].<sup>62</sup>

Surely, this is hate speech and incitement to hatred, but who knows whether Ley is in hate or whether he performs or enacts an *attitude* of hatred, expressive of a long-term and possibly painless desire for the destruction of "the Jew."

#### LOCATING HATRED

So far, we have explored hatred as something someone experiences. In the following, we want to question more explicitly Bauman's idea that sentiments, emotions, and passions – hatred and anti-Semitism included – belong to "the mysteries of individual psychology."<sup>63</sup> Once we leave behind the idea that hatred is imponderable, whimsical, and always antithetical to reason, and instead allow an understanding of hatred as saturated with norms, judgments, and reasons (however unjustifiable they may be), we have anchored hatred in the broader textures of social life – a life composed not merely of sentient bodies but of words, signs, buildings, laws, politics, and much more. But anchored how? And how far can or should we apply the term "hatred" to entities beyond the embodied mind?

A first step is to acknowledge the place of hatred in expressive actions. In current writings on legal expressivism, we find the idea that not only beliefs but also emotions, attitudes, desires, and personality traits can be expressed in formalized actions as well as through gestures, tone of voice, postures, etc. According to Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, actions can express attitudes because attitudes are (partly) constituted by reasons and aims:

To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons that attitude gives us. Let us therefore define a norm or principle for expressing an attitude as a rule that tells us what to count (and reject) as reasons for adopting particular ends.<sup>64</sup>

With regard to hatred, such an approach makes it possible to claim that actions are hateful insofar as they can meaningfully be interpreted as enactments of

the reasons, judgments, and desires associated with hatred. The usefulness of the anatomy of hatred presented above is that it helps clarify the more precise nature of these reasons, judgments, and desires – for example, if the actions seek to annihilate or destroy their target, if they express that the target of the action is odious, bad or evil, and if they are directed against entire groups or categories of people. Of course, actions are expressions or realizations of intentional states of mind, states of mind that are the property of a subject, whether individual or collective. But the actions stand in a non-binding or non-causal relationship with these states in the sense that the actions can express the reasons and desires of hatred without any specific bodily feelings necessarily being present.<sup>65</sup>

One could make a similar argument regarding speech or linguistic expressions. According to Jeremy Waldron, hate speech is a misnomer because it prompts the idea that the law is designed to correct the emotion behind the speech:

For most of us, the word ["hate"] highlights the subjective attitudes of the person expressing the views, or the person disseminating or publishing the message in question. It seems to characterize the problem as an attitudinal one, suggesting, I think misleadingly, that the aim of legislation restricting hate speech is to punish people's attitudes or control their thoughts.<sup>66</sup>

What matters here is not how to understand the target or aim of hate speech legislation, but rather the conventional assumption presented by Waldron (and shared by Bauman) that hatred must be located within persons. However, if one sees hatred as an attitude as such, hatred can be made present in concrete linguistic expressions without the inferred feeling being experienced by anyone. Thus, we identify an expression as hateful exactly as indicated above: a sign, a poster, a speech, or an utterance is hateful – viz., it expresses an attitude of hate – insofar as it reiterates or reflects some of the salient characteristics of hatred. Again, the question of whether someone somewhere actually harbors hateful feelings or personally harbors a hateful state of mind is irrelevant to the determination of whether an utterance is hateful. However, even though words and signs may be hateful, of course words and signs, as such, cannot hate. Hatred, as an emotion, requires an embodied, intentional, feeling subject.

<sup>63</sup> Horf, *The Jewish Enemy*, 155. <sup>64</sup> Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 33.

<sup>65</sup> Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, "Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 148, no. 5 (2000), 1510.

<sup>66</sup> See also Anti-Kauppinen, "Hate and Punishment," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 30, no. 10 (2015), 1719–1737.

<sup>67</sup> Jeremy Waldron, *The Harm in Hate Speech* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 34–35.

A different step away from the interiorized approach to hatred can be found in current theorizing on affect, where scholars have sought to move the investigation more fundamentally from “the psyche to the situation”<sup>67</sup> – that is, to approach affective upheavals as things that literally take place and circulate between persons or between persons and their material surroundings. However, alternatives to the interiorizing notion of emotion date back long before the so-called affective turn in cultural studies around the turn of the twenty-first century. For example, one of the most influential treatments of emotions ever – namely, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* – is not about individual psychology. Emotions thrive in the context of publicly shared norms and deliberation. Let us, however, focus on a less well-known and more recent approach. In *Sense and Non-Sense*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that we learn very little about emotions from introspection. Even though it has been a current trope in much psychology that we only gain true knowledge about emotions by looking inward and listening to what the person might excavate from “in there,” this conception of emotion is misleading. It is misleading because the idea of a psyche that resides within a bounded bodily space fails to acknowledge the extent to which human beings are not just expressing mental states but are in fact constituted through social interaction. Merleau-Ponty writes,

We must reject the prejudice that makes “inner realities” out of love, hate or anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behaviour, styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them . . . Emotion is not an inner fact but a variation in our relation with others and the world expressed in our bodily attitudes.<sup>68</sup>

If emotions can exist as variations in our relationships with one another and the world, it follows that such variations are not the sole property of either of the involved parties. The hate is in the very toning of the intensification of the relationship, which reaches into all those involved in the event, probably in different ways. This intensification of the relationship may comprise more than people, drawing in broader (re)configurations of objects and spatial surroundings as well. Consider the following example from Chaim Kaplan’s *Warsaw Diary*:

A rabbi in Lodz was forced to spit on a Torah scroll that was in the Holy Ark. In fear of his life, he complied and desecrated that which was holy to him and to his people. After a short while he had no more saliva, his mouth was dry. To the Nazi’s question, why did he stop spitting, the rabbi replied that his mouth was dry. The son of the “superior race” began to spit in the rabbi’s mouth, and the rabbi continued to spit on the Torah.<sup>69</sup>

If we follow Merleau-Ponty, a claim about the presence of hate in this case would not necessarily have to refer to the subjective feelings and thoughts of the Nazi (or indeed the rabbi). It could be a claim about the nature of the entire situation – impregnated as it is with deliberate destruction and malevolence. When emotion terms are ascribed to entire situations, we may use the analytical tools from the previous section to qualify why or in what ways the use of a specific term – “hated,” for example – is intelligible. To some extent, to locate hatred in actions, words, or situations reifies and externalizes hatred. It turns hatred into something that visibly occurs in our interaction, to be read and made sense of according to recognizable scripts for conduct.<sup>70</sup>

A final and perhaps more radical step is to expand the possible location of hatred to objects and our material surroundings. In order to explore this possibility we need to make a small excursion into theorizing about materiality and its place and role in human life. According to sociologist John Law, human sociality inherently emerges in and through materiality.<sup>71</sup> In processes of social ordering, human beings outsource or delegate functions and activities to our material surroundings, and such delegation has several implications. To the extent that one has access to what is delegated, it greatly enlarges human capacities, both individually and collectively: we can remember much more by storing things in media than by storing them in our brains; we can move faster when using vehicles; we can produce and manage many more rules when they are upheld by procedures; and many more people can be executed with a guillotine or murdered in a gas chamber than by hand. Furthermore, delegation stabilizes human relationships, making them more enduring.<sup>72</sup> When human relationships do not depend solely on face-to-face relationships between, for example, the stronger and the weaker, but on a whole set of materialized and mediated relations (laws, police, the military,

<sup>67</sup> Frederik Tyngstrup, “Affective Spaces,” in *Panic and Mourning: The Cultural Work of Trauma*, ed. Daniela Agostinho, Elisa Antz, and Cátia Ferreira (Berlin and Boston, MA: Walter de Gruyter, 2012). See also Sara Ahmed, “The Organization of Hate,” *Law and Critique* 12, no. 3 (2001), 345–365.

<sup>68</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense* [1948] (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), xii.

<sup>69</sup> Cited in Raymond Catia, *A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice* (London: Routledge, 2000), 68.

<sup>70</sup> A parallel example of this kind of analysis can be found in Sara Ahmed’s reflection on an example derived from Audre Lorde. See Ahmed, “The Organization of Hate,” 356.

<sup>71</sup> John Law, *Ordering Modernity* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).

<sup>72</sup> John Law, “Ordering and Obduracy,” online paper published by the Center for Science Studies (Lancaster: Lancaster University, 2001).

parliament buildings, jails), such institutionalized relations can persist much longer than the individual human beings and their particular relationships. But we do not simply outsource functions; we also embed ideology, norms, and values in our material surroundings. As Peter-Paul Verbeek has argued, morality can be inscribed in objects so that their way of being shaped and their way of functioning influence our choices and guide our actions: the prison walls and the locked doors uphold the norms of criminalization and retribution; the segregated restaurants uphold the racist norm of non-mixing; the material composition of the concentration camp upholds a norm of complete inferiority.<sup>73</sup> In all this, norms about proper conduct (do not break the law, do not sit at this table but at that table), divisions of people into categories (Jews or Aryans; criminals or law-abiding citizens), and judgments (some must die while others live; some are important while others are worthless) are inscribed in matter. Perhaps in some cases the materiality actually precedes the formula: the categories of people emerge from the incarceration, from segregation, from the encampment. Of course, none of this would be there if it had not, at some point, been formulated and executed by someone – but these norms, categories, and judgments can be solidified, transported, and enacted through materiality without anybody necessarily being present.

Material delegation produces relations of dependency, making us count on someone or something else to carry out certain functions, and this also implies that, sometimes, the capacity that is delegated is weakened in or vanishes from the individual human being. This is actually one of Bauman's central points about state-governed genocide: that we potentially become morally lazy or even blind when we distribute, for example, cruelty to systems of information and logistics, to machines and technological equipment. This does not mean that the cruelty disappears; it merely changes in its materiality. The ghetto walls may effectively substitute for the constant rejection and expulsion of particular Jews by particular guards and soldiers, but the reality, the brutality, and the segregation remain. Our question here is whether we can or should think about hatred in the same way. Can we delegate hatred to materiality, counting on it to perform the task of conveying and upholding the potential for the emergence of recurrent emotional experiences as well as stabilizing more long-term sentiments? And does the hatred thereby vanish from our sight, if we are too focused on the feelings (or indifference) of persons rather than on the broader landscape of norms, hierarchies, evaluations, knowledge, and actions in relation to which the persons are situated?

Obviously, these reflections about the location of hatred seek to incorporate the ways in which human interactions and relationships are often mediated by material objects. All aspects of hatred, except for consciousness as such and the actual bodily arousal, may in principle be located or expressed in texts, pictures, laws, buildings, machines, weapons, and fences. These material objects obviously do not hate, but they can store and distribute narratives of hatred, they may facilitate the categorization of people that are objects of hatred, they can provide the structural conditions for the continuous emergence of malevolent desire, and they can facilitate and magnify its realization. Not with any kind of final fixation of meaning – as Law asserts, materialization may solidify, but it always does so in ways that resist purity.<sup>74</sup> Thus, any assertion that, say, a law, a politics, a wall, or an architecture is one of hatred is by necessity the result of a process of interpretation.

#### CONCLUSION

If this investigation has met its aims, it has provided food for thought and inspiration for further studies of the topic of hatred and mass atrocities; studies that recognize similarities as well as differences between the many different forms of hatred at stake in the processes of mass violence and genocide. We hope to have shown that the realities people try to capture with the word “hatred” are indeed complex and diverse. Hatred can be categorized as an emotion, but even ordinary (and reasonable) uses of the word reach across any neat distinction between emotions, sentiments, and attitudes.

Let us return to our point of departure. We found in the works of Zygmunt Bauman a set of assumptions about hatred: that hatred (*qua* passion) is an imponderable, momentary, erratic, whimsical, unmanageable, irrational, and subjective thing, the object of individual psychology, and at loggerheads with anything modern. We have many reasons to admire the breadth and insights of Bauman's analysis of the Holocaust, but – and here we are perhaps being too frank – his take on hatred is not one of them. As we hope to have shown, hatred is not imponderable. Indeed, it has been pondered since antiquity, and even if it is a fuzzy and complex thing, it has a recognizable phenomenology and is a concept with a long history. If our analysis points in the right direction, it would also be misguided to assume that hatred is momentary, erratic, or whimsical. In our opinion, hatred can take the form of an episodic experience of rage or a burning desire to destroy or harm something or someone. Still, its more basic form seems to us to be that of a sentiment or attitude. In this case it

<sup>73</sup> Peter-Paul Verbeek, *Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of Things* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

<sup>74</sup> Law, “Order and Obduracy,” 2.

can be described as the very opposite of whimsical: as stubborn and enduring, as something that bespeaks a history and requires time and judgment to take root. Furthermore, is hatred unmanageable? Aristotle thought not, and we follow him, with some reservations. Of course, sometimes hatred appears in the form of a wild and vehement passion in the most emphatic sense of the word. The passion has taken control and the person is impervious – at least momentarily – to reason. However, hatred also appears in forms that can be incited, nurtured, stirred, appeased, and reasoned with. This is possible because feelings of hatred are related to relatively predictable perceptions, moral judgments, and beliefs about the social world. For the same reason, hatred and emotions more generally are not simply the antithesis or opposite of reason and rationality. Without emotion, we could hardly act rationally.

Finally, there is the question of Bauman's location of hatred in individual psychology. Opening the door to an understanding of hatred as something more than an emotion makes us aware of how the different elements of hatred may be distributed in actions, utterances, and even material objects. If, for example, we consider the 1935 Nuremberg Race Laws, they most certainly implied notions of their Jewish object as being something ineradicably different from the Germans. These laws did not express "hot" antipathy, but such antipathy was definitely expressed elsewhere, in speeches and propaganda. Further, propaganda pictures of "the Jew" conveyed images of the object as evil or dangerous without expressing desires to harm or annihilate, at the very same time as such policies were enacted elsewhere. And those enacting the annihilation were not all passionate anti-Semites; often they were bureaucratic organizers of technician-like facilitators, maintaining logistics, improving the material equipment of mass murder (gas vans and gas chambers), and leaving it up to technical installations and a smaller group of perpetrators to participate – close-up – in the actual killings. While each of these different agents, actions, expressions, and objects may not on their own be recognizably hateful, when read together as parts of a broader project they certainly add up to something that intelligibly can be understood as a politics or organization of hatred.

How does this all come together in the perspective of those who are subject to the entire undertaking, the victims? In our opinion no one has described the experienced totality of the destructive desire more vividly and precisely than Jean Améry, to whom we give the last word:

"To be a Jew, that meant for me, from this moment on, to be a dead man on leave, someone to be murdered, who only by chance was not yet where he properly belonged; and so it has remained, in many variations, in various

degrees of intensity, until today. The death threat, which I felt for the first time with complete clarity while reading the Nuremberg Laws, included what is commonly referred to as the methodic "degradation" of the Jews by the Nazis. Formulated differently: the denial of human dignity sounded the death threat. Daily, for years on end, we could read and hear that we were lazy, evil, ugly, capable only of misdeed, clever only to the extent that we pulled one over on others. We were incapable of founding a state, but also by no means suited to assimilate with our host nations. By their very presence, our bodies – hairy, fat, and bowlegged – befouled public swimming pools, yes, even park benches. Our hideous faces, depraved and spoilt by protruding ears and hanging noses, were disgusting to our fellow men, fellow citizens of yesterday. We were not worthy of love and thus also not of life. Our sole right, our sole duty was to disappear from the face of the earth.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Jean Améry, *At the Mind's Limits*, 86.