Pondering Hatred

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Hatred is a complex and difficult thing, in life as well as in theory. Its history in Western philosophy is as long as the history of love. It begins, perhaps quite appropriately, with a warning. There is, said Socrates, nothing worse than misology, the hatred of rational argumentation.\(^2\) In this form (at least), hatred is a matter of pathology, an evil to be prevented at all costs. At almost the same time and in exactly the same place, Aristotle told aspiring orators how to incite hatred (misos) in an audience. What he had in mind was definitely not misology. In his *Rhetoric*, hatred is presented as a normal and moral emotion, a socially acknowledged antagonism towards people with a vicious character or a harmful disposition.\(^3\) Much later, David Hume asserted that hatred is “altogether impossible to define.”\(^4\) Apparently, Immanuel Kant disagreed. He clearly defined hatred as a passion. Still, he admitted that there is something particularly “deceitful and hidden” about it. In an exceptional poetic moment, he wrote that if the affect (*Affekt*) of anger is like water that breaks through a dam, the passion (*Leidenschaft*) of hatred is “like a river that digs itself deeper and

\(^1\) Thanks to Lucy Allais, Jeffrey Blustein, David Konstan, Jeffrie Murphy, Thomas Szanto, and Dan Zahavi for helpful comments and suggestions.


deeper into its bed.” In fact, hatred has never been neatly defined or consistently categorized. Some philosophers have tried to delimit hatred by distinguishing it from anger, love, or revenge. Others have insisted on various sorts of entanglement between these same emotional phenomena. Some are preoccupied with the legitimacy of the modern criminalization of enactments of various kinds of group hatred. Others – dissatisfied with lazy notions that all hatred is a bad thing – are keen to provide “a word on behalf of good haters.”

Taken as a whole, the history of views on hatred may serve to remind us that we can – and probably sometimes should – ponder what we mean when we talk about hatred.

In the field of Holocaust and genocide studies, there is no shortage of reasons for such reflection. There is a sickening amount of evidence of hateful incitement in the archives on atrocity crimes, and hatred is a recurring theme in interviews and trials of perpetrators as well in testimonies of victims and bystanders. Consider, for example, the case of Adolf Eichmann. “His hatred”, as it is stated in the judgment of the Israeli court where he stood trial, “was cold and calculated, aimed rather against the Jewish people as a whole, than against the individual Jew, and for this very reason, it was so poisonous and destructive in all its manifestations.” Hannah Arendt, as we all know, saw nothing like that. She knew of course that “evil men” are supposed to be prompted, among other things, by hatred. However, what struck her was “a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives.”

Perhaps hatred, unlike emotions such as anger or disgust, can be difficult to detect? “We are all pretending”, said a Bosniak woman from the city of Mostar, “to be nice and to love each other. But, be it known that I hate them and that they hate me. It will be like that forever, but we are now pretending.” Jean Améry, our final example, did not pretend. He reflected publicly on the emotions with which his condition as a victim of the Nazi genocide was inflected: astonishment, distrust, fear, resentment – and hatred. The latter he knew from having been exposed to it. “To be a Jew” in the Third Reich was “to be a dead man on leave”. However, the topic of hatred is also at issue in his reflections on reseentment (which he insisted was not a matter of hatred) and in his

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7 Cited from: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/
mixed feelings for his Austrian home (*Heimatsehnsucht* mixing with *Heimathass*). Hatred – in the context of mass atrocities – takes many forms and raises many questions.

Still, the scholarly discussion has been focused rather exclusively on the role of hatred among the causes of mass destruction. At the one end of the spectrum one finds scholars such as Daniel J. Goldhagen for whom hatred, in the form of *eliminationism*, is the single most important factor behind genocidal violence. At the other end of the spectrum, a larger group of researchers argue that hatred is much less significant than one would perhaps expect. A telling title in this group is *Murder Without Hatred*.\(^{11}\) In the middle, an even larger number of scholars present some kind of multi-factor analysis in which hatred plays a moderate role.\(^{12}\) However, whether hatred is posited as all-important, completely marginal, or something in-between, there is a general lack of reflection on the nature or meaning of hatred as such.\(^{13}\) Our aim in this chapter is to engage in such reflection, not just to qualify the discussion of hatred’s causal role, but more importantly to invite reflection on the very nature and possible forms of hatred at stake in mass atrocities.

**Bauman on hatred**

We begin our investigation with a brief examination of the meaning of hatred in the works of Zygmunt Bauman. We do not take a position in the above-mentioned debate as to the causal role of hatred, and our decision to take Bauman as our starting point reflects neither a particular endorsement nor a rejection of his position regarding the causal role of hatred. Rather, our choice reflects two points. First, that he provides an exemplary case of the ambivalent place of hatred in much work on genocide and mass atrocity, that is, hatred as something important yet scantily conceptualized. Second, for both of us, Bauman’s work on the Holocaust was the point of entry into the study of the Holocaust and mass atrocities more generally. Curiously, when we first read Bauman – decades ago – we were both enthusiastic about his arguments concerning modernity, bureaucracy, and indifference. Like Bauman, we did not question the concept of hatred at stake in the entire exercise. But now we are moved to ask: what is the meaning of hatred in Bauman’s account of the Holocaust?


Across several works, starting with *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman argued that hatred does not explain the Holocaust. The mass murder was an outcome, first and foremost, of scientifically sustained projects of social and racial engineering, made possible by technological developments and an effective bureaucracy. Mass destruction could not rely on something as precarious and unpredictable as the emotions but had to be organized and routinized. The prime vice was not hatred but a combination of manufactured unconcern and an unbridled faith in social engineering. Bauman’s analysis contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the roles played by the thousands of people who took part in the Holocaust: the bureaucrat consumed not so much by ideological hatred as by a desire to fulfil his duties; the soldier performing his tasks without any deeper understanding of Nazi ideology; engineers and doctors primarily dedicated to their own careers and agendas; and not least the many people who went along unthinkingly, perhaps refusing to look deeper into the events that took place around them.

Bauman’s conclusion that hatred is marginal was reached with little critical reflection on its conceptual premises, and even though he wrote at length about anti-Semitism, its history and dynamics, the relationship between anti-Semitism and hatred was never unpacked. Maybe this is not surprising, as Bauman’s understanding of hatred seems largely instrumental to, or subsumed under, another, more important aim: to assert the inherently modern nature of the Holocaust. Claiming that the Holocaust was caused by hatred is, according to Bauman, wrong because such a claim fails to acknowledge the difference between the mechanisms of group violence and individual violence. Individual violence, according to Bauman, can be “rooted in personal passions, desires, hate, greed,” but these personal passions explain little when it comes to mass murder:

The mass murder of the Jews was not an outcome of a momentary outburst of crowd passion but of a long-term, systematic activity that involved meticulous planning, careful division of labor, and the cooperation of “ordinary” institutions and businesses normally engaged in such neutral operations as running the railway network, designing trucks, developing new chemicals, or building houses. As in all complex operations in which partial tasks must be closely correlated so that they combine in the fulfillment of the overall purpose, the Holocaust required neutralization of all personal motives that could interfere with the master plan: Its success could not be made dependent on such imponderable and unmanageable factors as the emotions and personal beliefs of the

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actors—for instance, the intensity of Jew-hatred in each of the hundreds of thousands of participants.\textsuperscript{15}

Worse still, to claim that hatred caused the Holocaust is not just mistaken; it is also occluding, because it protects from criticism and reflection that which most urgently needs it: modernity, its logics and institutions. The idea that the Holocaust was a (re)lapse into barbarity, a collapse of reason into pre-modern irrational passions, inhibits us from seeing that the Holocaust was completely within the bounds of modern society—that, indeed, the Nazi genocide would have been unthinkable without the elements that make up modernity:

Modernity would not get where it has got were it to rely on forces as erratic, whimsical, and thoroughly unmodern as human passions. Instead, it relied on the division of labor, on science, technology, scientific management, and the power of the rational calculation of costs and effects - all thoroughly unemotional.\textsuperscript{16}

In making this argument, Bauman expresses an understanding of hatred as a personal passion: an erratic, whimsical, unmanageable, imponderable entity – located firmly within the mysterious depths of individual psychology and operating exclusively in the realm of motives for interpersonal action. As the opposite of reason and rational calculation, hatred is – according to Bauman – thoroughly unmodern: “Modern mind shuns passion […] Whoever kills for love or hatred is out of modern bounds.”\textsuperscript{17}

To be fair, Bauman never intended to develop a sustained argument to support his assertions about hatred. It would therefore hardly be appropriate to reproach him for not elaborating his conception of hatred, because a conceptualization of hatred was not the issue. Bauman’s main concern was to explain the Holocaust, and his account relied on a fairly conventional Western notion of emotion/passion as irrational, unmanageable, unpredictable, interiorized.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, seen from the perspective of the sociology and philosophy of emotions, Bauman’s assertions about emotions

\textsuperscript{17} Bauman, “The Holocaust” (2007).
in general and hatred in particular seem rather simplistic and beg further elaboration and critical discussion. Drawing on insights from the philosophical work on the nature, meaning, and location of emotions, we aim to bring a more nuanced understanding of hatred to the field of genocide studies.

**On emotions**

In a moment we will focus specifically on hatred, but let us first attend briefly to the concept of emotions in general. While Bauman’s marginalisation of hatred builds on the idea that emotion and passion represent the very opposite of reason and rationality,\(^{19}\) most scholarship on the topic adopts a less dichotomous approach. As suggested by Jacques Barbalet, there are at least two alternatives to Bauman’s “conventional” approach: “the critical approach, in which emotion supports rationality by providing it with salience and goal-formation; and the radical approach, in which emotion and rationality are seen to be continuous.”\(^{20}\) Our investigation builds on conceptual tools and insights from both these alternatives.

Let us begin with the idea that emotions make the world not only known but significant to us.\(^{21}\) What is specifically emotional derives precisely from the directedness towards an object, which in an acute way tells us that something is going on in our world.\(^{22}\) “Emotions,” as Ben Ze’ev argues, “serve to safeguard and monitor our personal concerns.”\(^{23}\) Such assertions about the personalizing function of emotions should not prompt us to think that emotions are thereby random, private, or in any way detached from broader social contexts. Rather, the internalization and embodiment of community norms is part of what makes possible the notion of a self that can personally feel respected, insulted, recognized, violated and so on.\(^ {24}\) In this sense, one aspect of the emotions is their ability to actualize norms and values in the flesh, so to speak; for example, anger arises when one’s norms are being violated, and reassurance or trust when they are being confirmed. Through this intensification of something (persons, actions, relation, events) as relevant, emotions often simultaneously consolidate or verify the sense of the “me” or the “us” harbouring the emotion.

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\(^ {19}\) See: “passion is, by definition, the unreason. When we speak of passion, we also speak of the nonbeing of reason. Passion and reason are at loggerheads: one wilts and fades in the face of the other,” Bauman, “The Holocaust” (2007).


\(^ {22}\) Goldie, *The Emotions*, 238.


Emotions are not mere bodily sensations or arousals. We might feel nauseous, we might have a beating heart, or sweaty palms, restless legs, but that is only part of the emotional experience. In emotions, we are directed towards something in our world, namely the object that the emotional experience is about. This object might seem unclear (such as when you feel sad without really knowing why), or misdirected (such as when you get angry at your spouse because your boss is an idiot), but directedness or intentionality is still a defining part of most emotional experiences (moods like anxiety or boredom excepted). In emotions, the bodily arousal therefore connects with certain thoughts and judgements about the object of the emotion, tied together by culturally available narrative structures. The beating heart, sweaty palms, and restless legs are part of an experience that we might call, for example, anger towards someone who has betrayed us, contempt or pity towards those we consider low, or fear of that or those who threaten us. Whether it is one or the other – or one of the many possible inflections for which we do not always have particularly suitable emotion labels – depends not least on the broader narrative organization that the bodily arousals are part of. Norms about proper conduct, about being worthy, about what is expected from us, or about what we are supposed to fear, are thus part of the emotional experience and tie the bodily arousal to biographical memory, to political circumstances, to ideological frameworks, etc.

Likewise, mere cognition and evaluation about an object in the world does not constitute an emotion. What Peter Goldie called the “add on” principle for emotions tends to over-emphasize the cognitive aspects, treating the affective or bodily aspects merely as an appendage to the emotional experience.

Emotions have always been thought to involve a link to action. Indeed, this is what the term emotion indicates. Whether the link is direct or indirect, emotions involve motives, desires, maybe even behavioral dispositions or action-tendencies. For example, anger may be thought to be or to imply a desire for revenge and fear an impulse to flee. The basic idea that emotions inform or influence our actions or dispositions to act is perhaps the main reason why genocide scholars have shown some interest in hatred, and why the discussion of hatred in genocide studies has focused almost exclusively on the question of the causal role of hatred in explanations of the violence.

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25 Peter Goldie uses the distinction between ‘bodily feeling’ and ‘feeling towards’ to grasp this dual composition of the intentionality of emotions, Goldie, The Emotions.
26 Goldie, The Emotions, 18, 21.
27 Goldie, The Emotions, 5.
30 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the etymology of “emotion” suggests commotion, unrest, movement, agitation, displacement, and the like, of anything from the mind to the public or indeed a people.
However, although the relation between emotion and action in the case of hatred is generally thought to be relatively strong, one should take care not to assume any direct route from emotion to action. This was clear to Charles Darwin in his investigations of the expressions of the emotions in human beings and other animals:

A man may have his mind filled with the blackest hatred or suspicion, or be corroded with envy or jealousy, but as these feelings do not at once lead to action, and as they commonly last for some time, they are not shown by any outward sign, excepting that a man in this state assuredly does not appear cheerful or good-tempered.31

We noticed in Bauman the claim that emotions, hatred not least, are imponderable. However, in the following sections we will examine what happens if one ponders hatred as an emotion. As we hope to show, Bauman’s account of hatred and emotion as the opposite of reason and rationality and as located firmly within some interiorized, subjective experience tends to mask the plethora of observations that can actually be made as to the cognitive, evaluative, conative, structural, and material aspects of hatred.

**Pondering hatred**32

What happens if one brings to bear the analytical categories and distinctions (presented in the previous section) on a messy bundle of philosophical notions and ostensible examples of hatred (gathered from the Western tradition and the modern history of genocidal violence)? Most basically, we hope that readers will agree that hatred is not imponderable, but also that they will gain a deeper and broader understanding of hatred, its phenomenological and conceptual ambiguities included.33

Let us begin with the basic idea that emotions typically motivate or prompt us to wish, desire, want, or even do something. This is where most philosophers have located the heart of hatred. In Plato, hatred (in the form of misology) turns the afflicted away from what should count

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32 Given our interest in the context of mass atrocities, we generally refer to hatred rather than hate. As suggested by W. I. Miller, "hatred, the noun, and to hate, the verb, do not completely coincide in their semantic ranges. Hatred carries with it more intensity and greater seriousness than many of our most common uses of the verb"; William I. Miller, "Hatred", David Sander and Klaus R. Scherer (eds), *The Oxford Companion to Emotion and the Affective Sciences* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 203.
33 Our basic understanding of what pondering emotions can, at best, amount to is inspired not least by the works of Goldie, *The Emotions*, 1.
most (the pursuit of truth) as it prompts an enduring loathing of all argumentation. In Aristotle, hatred implies a wish that the odious other would cease to exist. Again, among the Stoics, hatred was defined as ‘a desire for something bad to happen to another progressively and continually.’ Much later, Kierkegaard presented a notion of hatred that induces relentless abandon: ‘I will never see this person again. Our paths are forever divided, separated by the yawning depth of hatred.’ Finally, in the shadow of the Holocaust Aurel Kolnai observed:

Prototypically, the “movement” proper to hatred is directed to the destruction of its object; or at least to an impact on the object stopping short of destruction but aligned with it and consonant to its spirit or symbolic of destruction in one essential respect (humiliation, insult, expulsion, etc.).

Kolnai’s claim, that hatred is inspired and governed prototypically by a destructive intent, seems dominant in reflections on hatred in the context of political mass violence. Sometimes, the point is openly stated (“the action-tendency [of hatred] is to cause B to cease to exist or otherwise be rendered harmless, for instance by permanent expulsion”), sometimes it is simply implied (“the antiman, as [Jean] Améry calls him, embodies hatred, for he wishes to annihilate Améry and his kind”). In comparison, the Stoic approach to hatred as a matter of malevolence is more prevalent in discussions of personal forms hatred. For example, in a recent essay, Jeffrie Murphy considers hatred as “a desire—based on the evil actions of the hated one—that the evildoer experience what

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34 Plato, *Phaedo*, 90d.
35 Cited from David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 189. The definition probably builds on an interpretation of Aristotle’s suggestion that one should think of hatred as the opposite of love. Aristotle did not define hatred in the *Rhetoric*, but he defined loving (*to philein*) as “wishing for the beloved what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about”, 1381a1.
he would regard as the worst thing that could happen to him—death for some people, perhaps, but for others something (in their view) even worse."\(^{40}\)

Whether experienced as a desire to harm or destroy, abandon or expel, hatred lies at the extreme end of the emotions at stake in our relational lives. The aims or desires involved in hatred differ interestingly from those characteristically related to anger or resentment. As noticed by Peter F. Strawson, resentment tends to inhibit goodwill somewhat, but in a way that is tied to regarding the wrongdoer as a member – in relatively good standing – of the moral community.\(^{41}\) As a response to a perceived breach of a normative expectation, resentment may motivate demands that the moral nature of what happened is acknowledged, that the culpable party is appropriately censured, that retribution is exacted or reassurance that the norms that have been breached are back in order. None of this, however, implies a wish or desire to seriously harm, kill or get rid of the wrongdoer as such.

Whether one ties hatred to a desire to harm, cause pain, or even annihilate its object, it seems logical to assume that such desires can be satisfied or at least exhausted. As Arne Johan Vetlesen suggests: “Having sought, found, and destroyed its chosen object, hate is exhausted, its subject content.”\(^{42}\) However, what haters desire or wish is sometimes something more unlimited or insatiable. In the poem “For Adolf Eichmann”, Primo Levi wrote:

Oh son of death, we do not wish you death.
May you live longer than anyone ever lived.
May you live sleepless five million nights,
And may you be visited each night by the suffering of everyone who saw,
Shutting behind him, the door that blocked the way back,
Saw it grow dark around him, the air fill with death.\(^{43}\)

Obviously, Levi does not believe that Eichmann will be able to live almost 14,000 years. At stake is a curse, expressive perhaps of an impossible wish for a retribution that would befit the magnitude of the crime. The wish is insatiable. But to express the wish that something like that should have

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\(^{40}\) Murphy, "A Word", 93.

\(^{41}\) Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London: Methuen, 1974).


happened to Eichmann, “progressively and continually,” (as the Stoics would have it) is morally possible, perhaps an example of poetic justice. Still, in accordance with the point suggested by Vetlesen, a person (perhaps Levi) who feels such a wish, will probably reach a time or a point where living or harboring the wish will no longer be humanely possible (even if it would still be morally justified or permissible). The desire or wish in hatred may also be unquenchable for a very different reason. “If it is true”, as David Konstan writes, “that we sometimes hate an aspect of ourselves that we have projected onto another, then we remain attached to the abominated other, and do not really wish to eliminate him or her.”\footnote{Konstan, \textit{The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks}, 199.} In this case, “hate transforms this or that other into an object whose expulsion or incorporation is needed, an expulsion or incorporation that requires the conservation of the object itself in order to be sustained.”\footnote{Sarah Ahmed, \textit{The Cultural Politics of Emotion} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 51.}

Our next analytical question pertains to the intentional object of hatred. Toward what can the eliminatory or malevolent desires be directed? Certainly, hatred can be deeply personal, directed against a particular individual. It is, however, a hallmark of hatred that it can also be felt toward entire groups and categories. In Plato, misologues hate \textit{all} argumentation and misanthropes hate \textit{every} human being, and as Aristotle frankly put it, “we all hate \textit{any} thief and \textit{any} informer” (our emphasis).\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric}, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle}, Vol 2, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 1382a.} Likewise, anti-Semites hate Jews, misogynists hate women, and the archives of genocidal propaganda overflow with expression of hate towards Armenians, Tutsi, and so on. The formal object, in all of the given cases, is an entire category of people, practices, or things. Notice, however, the difference between the categories at stake in what has been called modern hatreds (hatreds focused on entire identity groups) and the ancient Aristotelian view of hatred as directed toward categories of people who are judged to be of a vicious character or hostile disposition. At stake in the \textit{Rhetoric} is the hatred of the traitor or the thief, not of the Jew, the Muslim, the black (or white), or the gay. However, a closer look at the modern hatreds reveals – we think – that they are all, beneath the surface, about a wildly untenable idea of a nexus between a given group identity and moral evil. One never simply hates another ‘because he is Black’. One hates this other because one associates being Black with a menace. Also, if one hates every Tutsi or Jew as such, it may not really matter whether someone is male or female, child or adult, bright or stupid, a compatriot or a stranger, because every one of them is an instance of the kind or type or “race” toward which one’s hatred is directed. In this way, “hatred concentrates the attention of whoever holds that emotion.”\footnote{Horowitz, \textit{The Deadly Ethnic Riot}, 543.}
What the odious others, as individuals, have done, or what they individually think and feel, does not matter. We “know” that they are all evil. However, this logic of hate is – in reality – typically difficult to sustain, vulnerable to the non-identity of the actual other in relation to projected picture of an essential menace. Hence, entrepreneurs of hatred do their best to cultivate a second-order norm, which holds that what members of the outgroup actually and individually feel and think should or must not matter; that being susceptible to the thoughts and feelings of the targeted people is a sign of weakness. As the propagandists of the genocide in Rwanda put it in the eighth of the so-called “Ten Commandments of the Bahutu”: “The Bahutu must cease to have any pity for the Batutsi.”48 The cultivation of such norms can go hand in hand with the introduction of institutions, habits and practices that aim to make the fearful and odious imaginary a self-fulfilling prophecy.

All we have said so far – and all that is typically said in writings on hatred in the context of mass atrocities – has focused on the genocidal hatred of the perpetrators against a specific victim group. Opening the field of genocide studies to a more comprehensive investigation of hatred implies an inclusion of other possible objects. One could focus, for example, on victims’ hatred—their hatred toward particular individual perpetrators or specific organizations for what they have actually done. Such victim hatred would surely be markedly different insofar as the object is – sadly – not a product of fantasy and projection, but grim reality: the object is a person or an organization that (in actions as well as attitudes) has proved him, her or it self to be committed to evil. Within the same perspective (victim hatreds), one finds hatreds toward an entire people in whose name genocide has been committed. When asked whether he hated the Germans, Primo Levi said that he did not “accept hatred as directed collectively at an ethnic group, for example at all the Germans; if I accepted it, I would feel that I was following the precepts of Nazism, which were founded precisely on national and racial hatred.”49 Other object categories could be abstract ideological entities (such as Nazism or Fascism), general evils (such as violence),50 and the self (whether one was oneself a victim, bystander, or perpetrator).51 Clearly, the justifiability of some of these other manifestations of hatred differs markedly from genocidal hatreds, premised as they are

48 Semelin, To Purify and Destroy, 76, our emphasis.
50 See Karl Popper: “There are many people who hate violence and are convinced that it is one of their foremost and at the same time one of the most hopeful tasks to work for its reduction and, if possible, for its elimination from human life”. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002), 477.
51 See Jean Améry, At The Mind’s Limits, 51 (on self-hatred).
on extreme stereotyping, prejudice, and projection. To probe the difference we need to turn to the beliefs, appraisals, and judgments at stake in hatred.

One does not simply hate someone or something. One hates them or that for being or having done something, one hates for them for a reason, one believes or judges that or them to be or represent something. But what? Do we hate for a specific kind or range of reasons? In Plato, the misanthrope believes that every human being is “completely and utterly rotten.” In Aristotle, hatred is based on moral judgment or perception that the odious other is a bad or vicious kind of person. From a moral philosophical perspective, it interesting whether it is possible to harbor such judgments or perception and be open to evidence that the Other can or maybe already has changed in some morally relevant way (for example, through acts of remorse and atonement). However, with regard to deadly ethnic or genocidal group hatred, we agree with Donald Horowitz: “Those who hate believe that the object of their hatred has properties that do not change. They believe that, in a certain sense, the objects of hatred cannot help themselves, that the attributes are embedded in their nature”. As we read in an article printed in the Rwandan propaganda magazine Kangura from March 1993, “A cockroach gives birth to a cockroach ... the history of Rwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same.” In short, in modern genocides, the target group and its members are defamed, discriminated against, or attacked as instances or incarnations of an odious essence. As Joseph Goebbels put it, with scary precision, “Die Juden sind Schuld”—“the Jews are guilty”. Not, the Jews are guilty. The twisting of the ordinary grammar of guilt mirrors precisely the genocidal twisting of ordinary moral assumptions as to the objects and presuppositions of accountability.

To build up intense hatred the object has to be perceived not simply as an abstract evil, but as an evil and a fearful threat to us. Consider, for example, the Nazi imaginaire of “the Jew”: an allegedly existential threat to “us,” a fantastic picture of a monstrous creature filled with malevolence and hatred. More generally, public incitements of hatred against entire groups provide evidence of how the public cultivation of collective hatred typically builds on allegations of

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52 Phaedo, transl. Hackforth, 89e.
53 Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, 544.
56 This is of course not the only path to intense hate. For example, the intensity of hatred can be the result of an embittered love or some other kind of original attachment and subsequent disappointment. Also, if someone kills a child the parents may hate the murderer even though they do not fear her or him.
57 For more on hatred induced through fear, see Neta Crawford’s chapter in this volume.
malevolence or bad will from the out-group against the in-group and its members. Through wildly exaggerated if not completely unsubstantiated rumors, the outgroup is presented as hell-bent on the destruction of the in-group and detailed accounts of the atrocities committed by the others provide “evidence” about the depths of their cruel and hateful intentions.\(^{58}\) Genocidal hatred can be intertwined not only with fear, but also with disgust, that is, in the form of narratives and representations of the object as something that may pollute or poison the social body. Such ideas of pollution are typically enforced by representations of the object as vermin or diseases. The portrayals of, for example, Tutsis as cockroaches and Jews as rats or blood poisoning are well known.\(^{59}\)

Are the beliefs or judgments implied in hatred always unjustified or morally untenable? Nazi or racist hatred is the epitome of an attitude to others that cannot be supported by even minimally reasonable reasons. But what if we focus instead on hatred directed toward a particular individual evildoer; a willing executioner, an excessively callous and sadistic torturer? The hatred of such evildoers may of course be based on the torturer’s evil actions, but in hatred, contempt, and disgust the actions are typically taken as testimony of a vicious character, an evil person. Can such beliefs and judgments ever be warranted? People are seldom monolithically bad and even so a person’s character can change. This is a difficult issue. Further clarification requires discussion whether hatred is always “globalizing”.\(^{60}\)

Our final analytical question is about how it feels to hate. As mentioned in the previous section, feelings or bodily arousals are essential to almost any account of the emotions. Even Aristotle, a strong cognitivist, defines the emotions as constituted in part by accompanying feelings of pain and pleasure. The problem with hatred is that while he clearly presents it as an emotion, he also claims that it is not accompanied by pain. This is not the place for a discussion of this apparent contradiction in his *Rhetoric*.\(^{61}\) We simply want to use it as a first, but also a very telling, example of a basic challenge for most accounts – whether ancient of modern – of hatred, namely, that hatred can take both the form of an enduring attitude or sentiment and an occurrent emotion. Insofar as we are talking about hatred as an attitude or a sentiment, it does not necessarily involve any individuating or distinct feelings of pains and pleasure. Indeed, it might even – as

\(^{58}\) See Semelin, *To Purify and Destroy* and Horowitz *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*.


Aristotle claimed – be painless (and thus compatible with cool, rational calculation). Instead, one’s hatred is revealed or expressed in the emotions and feelings to which one is disposed. One may, for example, realize that one hates someone or something because of the emotions and feelings to which relations to the odious object give rise: Pleasure by the promise of their extinction, disgust in their bodily proximity, pride by participation in their destruction. But what about hatred as an occurrent emotion? Insofar as we may here draw on an example from literature rather than the history of mass atrocities, we may get a vivid description of what it feels like to hate if we listen to Dr. Frankenstein as he reflects on his feelings towards his creation:

My abhorrence of this fiend cannot be conceived. When I thought of him I gnashed my teeth, my eyes became inflamed, and I ardently wished to extinguish that life which I had so thoughtlessly bestowed. When I reflected on his crimes and malice, my hatred and revenge burst all bounds of moderation.

To feel hate, as an emotion, may be exactly this: Rage, aggression, teeth gnashing, eyes inflamed, and – most importantly – a burning desire to harm or destroy a deserving object. It is probably systematically unresolvable whether a particular expression of hatred is an expression of an occurrent emotion or an enduring attitude. Consider this excerpt from a speech delivered in Amsterdam in 1942 by Nazi Labor Front leader Robert Ley. “The Jew,” he said, “is a great danger to humanity”:

It’s not enough to bring him someplace [ihn irgend wohin zu bringen]. That would be as if one wanted to lock up a louse somewhere in a cage. (Laughter) They would find a way out and again they come out from under and make you itch again. (Laughter) You have to annihilate [vernichten] them, you have to exterminate them [for what] they have done to humanity ... (interrupted by ongoing applause).

62 For similar points with regard to love, see Peter Goldie, “Love for a Reason”, Emotion Review 2, no. 1 (Jan 2010), 61-67.
64 Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 155.
Surely, this is hate speech and incitement to hatred, but who knows whether Ley is in hate or whether he performs or enacts an attitude of hatred, expressive of a long-term and possibly painless desire for the destruction of “the Jew.”

**Locating hatred**

So far, we have explored hatred as something someone experiences. In the following, we want to question more explicitly Bauman’s idea that sentiments, emotions, and passions – hatred and anti-Semitism included – belong to “the mysteries of individual psychology.” Once we leave behind the idea that hatred is imponderable, whimsical, and always antithetical to reason, and instead allow an understanding of hatred as saturated with norms, judgements, and reasons (however unjustifiable they may be), we have anchored hatred in the broader textures of social life – a life composed not merely of sentient bodies but of words, signs, buildings, laws, politics, and much more. But anchored how? And how far can or should we apply the term ‘hatred’ to entities beyond the embodied mind?

A first step is to acknowledge the place of hatred in expressive actions. In current writings on legal expressivism, we find the idea that not only beliefs but also emotions, attitudes, desires, and personality traits can be expressed in formalized actions as well as through gestures, tone of voice, postures etc. According to Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, actions can express attitudes because attitudes are (partly) constituted by reasons and aims:

> To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons that attitude gives us. Let us therefore define a norm or principle for expressing an attitude as a rule that tells us what to count (and reject) as reasons for adopting particular ends.66

With regard to hatred such an approach makes it possible to claim that actions are hateful insofar as they can meaningfully be interpreted as enactments of the reasons, judgements and desires associated with hatred. The usefulness of the anatomy of hatred presented above is that it helps clarify the more precise nature of these reason, judgements and desires, for example, if the actions seek to annihilate or destroy their target, if they express that the target of the action is odious, bad or evil, and if they are directed against entire groups or categories of people. Of course, actions are

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expressions or realizations of intentional states of mind, states of mind that are the property of a subject, whether individual or collective. But the actions stand in a non-binding or non-causal relationship with these states in the sense that the actions can express the reasons and desires of hatred, without any specific bodily feelings necessarily being present.67

One could make a similar argument regarding speech or linguistic expressions. According to Jeremy Waldron hate speech is a misnomer because it prompts the idea that the law is designed to correct the emotion behind the speech:

For most of us, the word [“hate”] highlights the subjective attitudes of the person expressing the views, or the person disseminating or publishing the message in question. It seems to characterize the problem as an attitudinal one, suggesting, I think misleadingly, that the aim of legislation restricting hate speech is to punish people’s attitudes or control their thoughts.68

What matters here is not how to understand the target or aim of hate speech legislation, but rather the conventional assumption presented by Waldron (and shared with Bauman) that hatred must be located within persons. However, if one sees hatred as an attitude, as such hatred can be made present in concrete linguistic expressions without the inferred feeling being experienced by anyone. Thus, we identify an expression as hateful exactly as indicated above: a sign, a poster, a speech or an utterance is hateful, viz. expresses an attitude of hate, insofar as it reiterates or reflects some of the salient characteristics of hatred. Again, the question whether someone somewhere actually harbours hateful feelings, or personally harbours a hateful state of mind, is irrelevant to the determination whether an utterance is hateful. However, even though words and signs may be hateful, of course words and signs, as such, cannot hate. Hatred, as an emotion, requires an embodied, intentional, feeling subject.

A different step away from the interiorized approach to hatred can be found in current theorizing on affect, where scholars have sought to move the investigation more fundamentally from “the psyche to the situation,”69 that is, to approach affective upheavals as something that literally takes place and circulates between persons or between persons and their material

surroundings. However, alternatives to the interiorizing notion of emotion date back long before the so-called affective turn in cultural studies around the turn of the 21st century. For example, one of the most influential treatments of emotions ever, namely Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, is not about individual psychology at all. Emotions thrive in the context of publicly shared norms and deliberation. Let us, however, focus on a less well-known and more recent approach. In *Sense and Non-Sense*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that we learn very little about emotions from introspection. Even though it has been a current trope in much psychology that we only gain true knowledge about emotions by looking inwards and listening to what the person might excavate from “in there,” this conception of emotion is misleading. It is misleading because the idea of a psyche that resides within a bounded bodily space fails to acknowledge the extent to which human beings are not just expressing mental states but are in fact constituted through social interaction. Merleau-Ponty writes:

> We must reject the prejudice that makes “inner realities” out of love, hate or anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behaviour, styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them (…) Emotion is not an inner fact but a variation in our relation with others and the world expressed in our bodily attitudes.  

If emotions can exist as variations in our relationships with one another and the world, it follows that such variations are not the sole property of either of the involved parties. The hate is in the very toning of the intensification of the relationship, which reaches into all those involved in the event, probably in different ways. This intensification of the relationship may comprise more than people, drawing in broader (re)configurations of objects and spatial surroundings as well. Consider the following example from Chaim Kaplan’s *Warsaw Diary*:

> A rabbi in Lodz was forced to spit on a Torah scroll that was in the Holy Ark. In fear of his life, he complied and desecrated that which was holy to him and to his people. After a short while he had no more saliva, his mouth was dry. To the Nazi’s question, why did

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he stop spitting, the rabbi replied that his mouth was dry. The son of the ‘superior race’ began to spit in the rabbi’s mouth, and the rabbi continued to spit on the Torah.  

If we follow Merleau-Ponty, a claim about the presence of hate in this case would not necessarily have to refer to the subjective feelings and thoughts of the Nazi (or indeed the rabbi). It could be a claim about the nature of the entire situation – impregnated as it is with deliberate destruction and malevolence. When emotion-terms are ascribed to entire situations, we may use the analytical tools from the previous section to qualify why or in what ways the use of a specific term, “hatred” for example, is intelligible. To some extent, to locate hatred in actions, words or situations reifies and externalizes hatred. It turns hatred into something that visibly occurs in our interaction, to be read and made sense of according to recognizable scripts for conduct.

A final and perhaps more radical step is to expand the possible location of hatred to objects and our material surroundings. In order to explore this possibility we need to make a small excursion into theorizing about materiality and its place and role in human life. According to sociologist John Law, human sociality inherently emerges in and through materiality. In processes of social ordering human beings outsource or delegate functions and activities to our material surroundings, and such delegation has several implications. To the extent that one has access to what is delegated, it greatly enlarges human capacities both individually and collectively: we can remember much more by storing things in media than by storing them in our brains; we can move faster when using vehicles; we can produce and manage many more rules when they are upheld by procedures, and many more people can be executed with a guillotine or murdered in a gas chamber than by hand. Furthermore, delegation stabilizes human relationships, making them more enduring. When human relationships do not depend solely on face-to-face relationships between, for example, the stronger and the weaker, but on a whole set of materialized and mediated relations (laws, police, the military, parliament buildings, jails), such institutionalized relations can persist much longer than the individual human beings and their particular relationships. But we do not simply outsource functions, we also embed ideology, norms, and values in our material surroundings. As Peter-Paul Verbeek has argued, morality can be inscribed in objects so that their

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72 A parallel example of this kind of analysis can be found in Sara Ahmed’s reflection on an example derived from Audre Lorde, Ahmed “The Organization of Hate”, 356.
74 John Law, “Ordering and Obduracy”, Workpaper from Center for Science Studies (Lancaster University, 2001)
way of being shaped and their way of functioning influence our choices and guide our actions: the prison walls and the locked doors uphold the norms of criminalization and retribution; the segregated restaurants uphold the racist norm of non-mixing; the material composition of the concentration camp upholds a norm of complete inferiority. In all this, norms about proper conduct (do not break the law, do not sit at this table but at that table), divisions of people into categories (Jews – Aryans, criminals – law abiding citizens), and judgements (some must die – others live, some are important – others are worthless), are inscribed in matter. Perhaps in some cases the materiality actually precedes the formula: the categories of people emerge from the incarceration, from segregation, from the encampment. Of course, none of this would be there if it had not, at some point, been formulated and executed by someone—but these norms, categories, and judgements can be solidified, transported, and enacted through materiality without anybody necessarily being present.

Material delegation produces relations of dependency, making us count on someone or something else to carry out certain functions, and this also implies that, sometimes, the capacity that is delegated is weakened in or vanishes from the individual human being. This is actually one of Bauman’s central points about state-governed genocide: that we potentially become morally lazy or even blind when we distribute, for example, cruelty to systems of information and logistics, to machines and technological equipment. This does not mean that the cruelty disappears; it merely changes in its materiality. The ghetto walls may effectively substitute for the constant rejection and expulsion of particular Jews by particular guards and soldiers, but the reality, the brutality, and the segregation remain. Our question here is whether we can or should think about hatred in the same way. Can we delegate hatred to materiality, counting on it to perform the task of conveying and upholding the potential for the emergence of occult emotional experiences as well as stabilizing more long-term sentiments? And does the hatred thereby vanish from our sight, if we are too focused on the feelings (or indifference) of persons, rather than the broader landscape of norms, hierarchies, evaluations, knowledge, and actions in relation to which the persons are situated?

Obviously, these reflections about the location of hatred seek to incorporate the ways in which human interactions and relationships are often mediated by material objects. All aspects of hatred, except for the actual bodily arousal, may in principle be located or expressed in texts, pictures, laws, buildings, machines, weapons, and fences. These material objects obviously do not hate, but they can store and distribute narratives of hatred, they may facilitate the categorization of

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people that are objects of hatred, they can provide the structural conditions for the continuous emergence of malevolent desire, and they can facilitate and magnify its realization. Not with any kind of final fixation of meaning – as Law asserts: materialization may solidify but it always does so in ways that resist purity.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, any assertion that, say, a law, a politics, a wall, an architecture is one of hatred is by necessity the result of a process interpretation.

**Conclusion**

If this investigation has met its aims, it has provided food for thought and inspiration for further studies of the topic of hatred and mass atrocities; studies that recognize similarities as well as differences between the many different forms of hatred at stake in the processes of mass violence and genocide. We hope to have shown that the realities people try to capture with the word hatred are indeed complex and diverse. Hatred can be categorized as an emotion, but even ordinary (and reasonable) uses of the word reach across any neat distinction between emotions, sentiments, and attitudes.

Let us return to our point of departure. We found in the works of Zygmunt Bauman a set of assumptions about hatred: that hatred (qua passion) is an imponderable, momentary, erratic, whimsical, unmanageable, irrational, and subjective thing, the object of individual psychology and at loggerheads with anything modern. We have many reasons to admire the breadth and insights of Bauman’s analysis of the Holocaust, but – and here we are perhaps being too frank – his views on hatred as a passion is not one of them. As we hope to have shown, hatred is not imponderable. Indeed, it has been pondered since antiquity and even if it is a fuzzy and complex thing, it has a recognizable phenomenology and is a concept with a long history. If our analysis points in the right direction, it will also be misguided to assume that hatred is momentary, erratic, or whimsical. In our opinion hatred can take the form of an episodic experience of rage or a burning desire to destroy or harm something or someone. Still, its more basic form seems to us to be that of a sentiment or attitude. In this case it can be described as the very opposite of whimsical: as stubborn and enduring, as something that bespeaks a history and requires time and judgment to take root. Furthermore, is hatred unmanageable? Aristotle thought not and we follow him with some reservations. Of course, sometimes hatred appears in the form of a wild and vehement passion in the most emphatic sense of the word. The passion has taken control and the person is impervious – at least momentarily – to reason. However, hatred also appears in forms that can be incited,

\textsuperscript{76} Law, “Order and Obduracy”, 2.
nurtured, stirred, appeased, and reasoned with. This is possible because feelings of hatred are related to relatively predictable perceptions, moral judgments, and beliefs about the social world. For the same reason, hatred and emotions more generally are not simply the antithesis or opposite of reason and rationality. Without emotion we could hardly act rationally.

Finally, there is the question of Bauman’s location of hatred in individual psychology. Opening the door to an understanding of hatred as something more than an emotion makes us aware of how the different elements of hatred may be distributed in actions, utterances and even material objects. If, for example, we consider the 1935 Nuremberg Race Laws, they most certainly implied notions of their Jewish object as being something ineradically different from the Germans. These laws did not express “hot” antipathy, but such antipathy was definitely expressed elsewhere, in speeches and propaganda. Further, propaganda pictures of “the Jew” conveyed images of the object as evil or dangerous without expressing desires to harm or annihilate, at the very same time that such policies were enacted elsewhere. And those enacting the annihilation were not all passionate anti-Semites; often they were bureaucratic organizers or technician-like facilitators, maintaining logistics, improving the material equipment of mass murder (gas vans and chambers), leaving it up to technical installations and a smaller group of perpetrators to participate – close up – in the actual killings. While each of these different agents, actions, expressions, and objects, may not each on its own be recognizably hateful, when read together as parts of a broader project they certainly add up to something that intelligibly can be understood as a politics or organization of hatred.

How does this all come together in the perspective of those who are subject to the entire undertaking, the victims? In our opinion no one has described the experienced totality of the destructive desire more vividly and precisely than Jean Améry, to whom we give the last word:

To be a Jew, that meant for me, from this moment on, to be a dead man on leave, someone to be murdered, who only by chance was not yet where he properly belonged; and so it has remained, in many variations, in various degrees of intensity, until today. The death threat, which I felt for the first time with complete clarity while reading the Nuremberg Laws, included what is commonly referred to as the methodic “degradation” of the Jews by the Nazis. Formulated differently: the denial of human dignity sounded the death threat. Daily, for years on end, we could read and hear that we were lazy, evil, ugly, capable only of misdeed, clever only to the extent that we pulled one over on others. We were incapable of founding a state, but also by no means suited to assimilate
with our host nations. By their very presence, our bodies—hairy, fat, and bowlegged—befouled public swimming pools, yes, even park benches. Our hideous faces, depraved and spoilt by protruding ears and hanging noses, were disgusting to our fellow men, fellow citizens of yesterday. We were not worthy of love and thus also not of life. Our sole right, our sole duty was to disappear from the face of the earth.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{77}Jean Améry, \textit{At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities}. Translated by S. Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 86.